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Anniversaries are occasions for remembrance and reflections on one’s history. Many central banks
take the occasion of an anniversary to publish books on their history. In this essay we discuss five
recent books on the history of central banking and monetary policy. In these volumes, the Great
Financial Crisis and the way which it obliged central banks to reinvent themselves occupies an
important place. Although this was certainly not the first time in the history of central banking, the
magnitude of the modern episode is remarkable. As comes clearly to the fore in these volumes,
there is now, also in the historiography of central banking, much more attention to the (shifting)
balance between price stability and financial stability. The history of central banking is more
perceived as one of an institution whose predominant concern varied between “normal” times and
“extraordinary” times. So, central banks will have to remain vigilant, as one should expect financial
crises to return. Moreover, the new world of central banking, with a greater responsibility of central
banks for financial stability, will make life more complicated for central banks. It may have also
consequences for central bank independence, as the modalities of the two mandates, price and
financial stability, are not the same. Another aspect which comes to the fore in these volumes is the
relationship between central banking and state formation. Historically, central banks have been
embedded in processes of nation-building. By extending their network of branches across the
country, or by being at a center of a system of liquidity provision, ultimately tied to the national
currency, they played a key role in the shaping of “national economies”.
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1Review Essay: Central Banking Through the Centuries
Anniversaries are occasions for remembrance and reflections on one’s history. Many
central banks take the occasion of an anniversary to publish books on their history. In the
early decades of the 19th century several central banks were founded, starting with the
Banque de France in 1800, giving rise to many commemorations in the first decades of the
21st century. In 2016, the Bank of Norway and the Austrian Nationalbank have published
several volumes to commemorate their bicentenary. Moreover, the oldest central bank in
the world, the Sveriges Riksbank, celebrated its 350th anniversary in 2018, publishing also
a volume on the Sveriges Riksbank and the history of central banking. As emphasized by
Thomas J. Jordan, the Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank (SNB),
in his Foreword to a volume on Swiss monetary history, these books are also important for
actual policy making: “When the SNB’s Governing Board makes decisions, it does so within
the framework of a monetary policy strategy, which is itself anchored in a legal and
constitutional mandate; these structures are both products of history. In seeking to
understand the evolution of monetary policy frameworks, readers will gain greater
knowledge of the wider context in which we operate and deeper insight into the decisions
we take.” (in Baltensperger and Kugler 2017, p. xvii).
In “Central Banks at a Crossroads. What can we learn from history?”, edited by
Michael D. Bordo, Oyvind Eitrheim, Marc Flandreau, and Jan F. Qvigstad (2016), one of the
volumes for the Norwegian central bank bicentenary, the key themes of central banking are
discussed from a historical perspective. The focus is on four issues: the central bank as an
institution; the central bank as part of the international monetary system; the central bank
and other national institutions; the central bank from a practitioner’s perspective. Among the
contributors are many distinguished specialists of central banking, like for instance Claudio
Borio, Barry Eichengreen, Charles Goodhart, Harold James, Hugh Rockoff, Catherine
Schenk, Hyun Song Shin, Gianni Toniolo or Eugeen White.
A special place in the world of central banking is taken by the Bank of England, not
only because it is second oldest central bank (after the Riksbank), but also because of the
central role of the pound sterling and the London financial markets in international monetary
history. To commemorate its tercentenary, in 1994, the Bank of England organized a
conference “The future of central banking” (Capie et al. 1994). In many ways, the Bank of
England book still provides a benchmark for the present volumes on the history of central
banking, even if, since 1994, the world has changed with the end of the Great Moderation
and the Great Financial Crisis. Bordo, Eitrheim, Flandreau, and Qvigstad (2016) are very
explicit on this: “Our approach is inspired by the broad coverage of the historical evolution
of central banks up to 1994 when the Bank of England celebrated its tercentennial. Around
that time the academic literature focused specifically on inflation control and central bank
independence. Twenty years later, and with recent experiences of the global financial crisis
in mind, we have learnt that a stable monetary system requires more than inflation control
and independence. A stable monetary system requires that the three dimensions of a trinity
of price stability, financial stability and a well-functioning payment system are all jointly in
place, acknowledging of course their mutual interdependence” (p. xvii).
When the global financial crisis of 2008 brought the so-called Great Moderation
decisively to an end, it was not long until the outcome was described as the “Great
Recession”. After the crisis erupted, central banks identified the culprits in the shape of a
number of pre-crisis blind-spots: extensive credit in the banking system, but also, and more
fundamentally, the burgeoning of credit by non-banks or shadow banks. As observed by
Bordo, Eitrheim, Flandreau, and Qvigstad (2016), this was not a new phenomenon: “Just
as had occurred in the crisis of 1866 with bill brokers or in 1907 and 1929 with financial
2trusts, an enormous credit system had proliferated in the shadow of the banking system,
resulting in ballooning debts.” (p. 4)
In response to the Great Financial Crisis, central banks reinvented themselves.
Although this was certainly not the first time in the history of central banking, the magnitude
of the modern episode is remarkable. Three aspects can be emphasized:
- Firstly, regarding monetary policy, interest rates were lowered to unprecedented
levels, accompanied in some major advanced countries by purchases of
government securities, the so-called quantitative easing.
- Secondly, macro-prudential regulation gained ground. Inflation targeting was
necessary but, by itself, insufficient to curb the financial cycle.
- Thirdly, from the point of view of central banking operations, central banks expanded
their balance sheets as never before.
In the light of the recent financial crisis, there is now much more attention to the
(shifting) balance between price stability and financial stability. The history of central
banking is more perceived as one of an institution whose predominant concern varied
between “normal” times and “extraordinary” times.
In their contribution on the history of the financial stability mandate (FSM) of central
banks, Gianni Toniolo and Eugene N. White, conclude that central banks performed quite
well in “normal” times, but had difficulties during “extraordinary” times, also because of
financial innovations: “most supervisory regimes successfully managed financial systems
in ordinary times, sometimes preventing a troubled institution from generating a systemic
crisis, but were less capable of dealing with extraordinary macro-systemic shocks, which
they were not designed to confront. When macro-systemic shocks overwhelmed
supervisors’ capacity to meet the FSM, the shocks led to regulatory/supervisory regime
shifts that primarily addressed past deficiencies, rather than focusing on reforms to ensure
the stability of a continually innovating financial system.” (p. 485).
Another aspect which comes to the fore in this volume is the relationship between
central banking and state formation. Historically, central banks have been embedded in
processes of nation-building. By extending their network of branches across the country, or
by being at a center of a system of liquidity provision, ultimately tied to the national currency,
they defined the meaning of “domestic economy” and made modern macroeconomic policy
possible.
In this respect, Bordo, Eitrheim, Flandreau, and Qvigstad (2016) also emphasise that
money and the financial system are based on trust, and that the modern state had an
important role as a “producer of trust”: “It is not surprising perhaps that where the
consolidation of trust took place in Western Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth
century, a form of institutional proliferation occurred whereby state and privileged banks
controlled one another: This makes the early history of central banking a narrative of how
rents and privileges were granted by the state to private institutions (bank of issue) and how
the banks of issue reciprocated by improving the credit and liquidity of state debt. The result
was an evolutionary process whereby compromises had to be found between the needs of
public finance and the conduct of monetary policy. It did not go without failures or
controversies. The temptation of cash-strapped governments to extract more seigniorage
from the bank led to episodes of monetary exploitation, which usually resulted in a reduction
of credit for both the state and the central bank.” (p. 2).
In 2018 Sveriges Riksbank celebrated its 350-years anniversary. This volume,
“Sveriges Riksbank and the History of Central Banking”, edited by Rodney Edvinsson, Tor
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of some of the important central banks worldwide. The Riksbank was established in 1668,
after the collapse of Stockholms Banco. It is thereby the world’s oldest central bank, at least
among the currently existing central banks. A clear ambition of this book is to place the
history of the Riksbank in an international context in the development of central banking.
For this reason, it assembles historical presentations of the central banks of the major
countries (besides Sweden, England, Spain, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Italy, Japan,
the United States, Germany, and China, as well as the European Central Bank) and
presents comparisons between these. Each chapter has a common theme, centred on the
history of the various functions of money and central banking.
A useful reference point in the history of central banking is the 1921 manifesto of
Montagu Norman, the long-serving Governor of the Bank of England.  This manifesto
outlined the main features of modern central banks: independence from governments,
separation from commercial banks, supervision of the banking system and international
cooperation. As observed by Gianni Toniolo in his contribution of the Bank of Italy, “A
century later, central banks, hugely increased in number, show a good deal of common
traits but are still far from being the homogeneous lot envisaged by Norman. The study of
the evolution of individual central banks can shed light on national economic, institutional
and political history as well as on the drivers of change of central banking at the international
level.” (p. 298).
The idiosyncratic traits of the central banks of the world’s most important economies,
like the United States and China, come very well to the fore in this book. Barry Eichengreen,
in the chapter on the United States, highlights the profound opposition, reflecting deep
currents in American society, to a centralized approach to central banking in the United
States, at least until 1935: “When the drawbacks of this approach were laid bare by crises
in 1893 and 1907, the Federal Reserve System was created, but again on a decentralized
basis. This approach reflected distinctive American attributes, from deep-seated distrust of
‘monied interests’ to suspicion, bordering on hostility, between the country’s South and
West on the one hand and its Northeast on the other, to a strict constructionist interpretation
of the Constitution that privileged the rights of the states over the federal government –
attributes and attitudes that similarly shaped the debates over the First and Second Bank
of the United States” (p. 361).
There is also a contribution on the history of the People’s Bank of China, written by
Franklin Allen, Xian Gu, and Jun ‘QJ’ Qian. As the editors emphasise, this is, “to the best of
our knowledge the first one”. While China had long experimented with paper currency and
financial institutions, it was not until 1897 that the first modern bank was formed, the Imperial
Bank of China. The People’s Bank was established in 1948, just before the foundation of
the People’s Republic of China. The chapter shows how the People’s Bank of China evolved
from initially a mixture of a commercial bank and a central bank, typical for a planned
economy, to what can be thought of as a modern central bank.
Not surprisingly, the issue of “normal” and “extraordinary” times comes also to the fore
in this volume. Charles Goodhart, in his contribution on the Bank of England, observes how
much more difficult the concept of financial stability is, compared to price stability, with the
ensuing consequences for central banking: “In the field of macro-monetary policy, the aim
of achieving price stability has been a constant. What changed was the intermediate means
(the target) for doing so, from Gold Standard, to Bretton Woods peg, to monetary target, to
inflation target. In pursuit of financial stability, however, ideas about (and following on from
that the structure of) regulation and supervision have changed dramatically over the
centuries and in recent decades” (p. 164).
Otmar Issing, a founding member of the Executive Board of the European Central
Bank, is quite critical of the ECB policy during the crisis, arguing that it might endanger the
4ECB’s independence: “the recent monetary policy might undermine the ECB’s reputation
as an independent central bank. Starting in May 2010, with substantial purchases of bonds
of some governments under pressure from markets, the ECB has implicitly taken on a new
role as guarantor of the maintenance of the membership of countries in the EMU, when in
fact this should rather fall within the scope of responsibility of national governments” (p.
485). In his view, decisions of the Governing Council, especially on the purchase of
governments bonds, were “inevitably burdened by political considerations, considerations
which should have no place in an independent central bank. The effectiveness of the ECB
as the ‘only game in town’ is a dangerous threat to the independence of the central bank.”
(p. 485). In a certain way, Issing hereby also raises the issue of the relationship between
the central bank and state building, or between monetary union and political union, a
common theme in the books here considered.
Masato Shizume, in the chapter on the Bank of Japan, is confronted with another limit
of monetary policy and central banking. Indeed, among central banks in the world since
World War Two, the Bank of Japan was the first to hit the zero lower bound, in 1995, and
introduce “unconventional” monetary policy measures in the following decades. However,
as observed by Masato Shizume, the effects on economic growth remained limited:
“Despite these innovations in monetary policy, growth of the money stock has remained
stable and stagnant since the 1990s, suggesting that structural factors such as the
decreasing and aging of the population and low investment demand on new IT industries
with large network externalities may lie behind the stagnation.” (p. 355).
Clement Jobst and Hans Kernbauer, in “The Quest for Stable Money, Central Banking
in Austria, 1816-2016”, provide an overview of the history of the Austrian central bank at its
bicentenary. During these two centuries, Austria has experienced a dramatic history, not
only in economic and financial matters, but also in political ones. The Austrian empire was
often at war in the 19th century, and, consequently, the governments were in search of
funding for the wars, with the ensuing consequences for monetary and financial stability.
Moreover, Austria was a multicultural empire. After the loss of the war against Prussia, the
empire was reorganized in 1867 into a dual monarchy, whereby the “Nationalbank” was
transformed into the “Austro-Hungarian Bank”. As Austria was on the losing side of World
War One, the empire was dismantled, the currency union collapsed and hyperinflation
followed. The interwar period, with the Creditanstalt crisis and the great Depression were
again a turbulent period. In contrast, the post World War Two period was much more quiet.
There was a strong recovery after the war and, with its hard currency policy, Austria became
a natural member of Europe’s monetary union.
In this volume, Jobst and Kernbauer have chosen to focus on two dimensions of
central banking: monetary stability and financial stability. They acknowledge that the
meaning of monetary and financial stability has changed during the past two centuries.
Originally, money was considered to be stable if all coins were struck with consistent
amounts of metal; later, the notion of monetary stability was linked with the convertibility of
paper money against metal. Not until the 20th century was monetary stability understood as
the stability of a broadly defined index of consumer prices. Financial stability, as also
observed by Goodhart, on the other hand, has typically been a much broader concept,
embracing the smooth operation of payment systems; last resort lending; the supervision
of individual banks and other financial intermediaries; or the prevention of macroeconomic
imbalances such as real estate price bubbles, which may jeopardize the stability of the
entire financial system. But, as Jobst and Kernbauer (2016) emphasise, the basic issue of
monetary and financial stability has mostly been the same: “Since money has been around,
the sovereigns who exercised the right of coinage had an incentive to finance their
expenditure by debasing the currency, either by reducing the weight of coins or by adding
base metals to the alloy. Numerous instances of inflation from Classical antiquity to the
modern age demonstrate this process. Paper money, once it had been invented, made
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long history as well.” (p. 8).
The authors highlight very well how the central bank’s authority to shape monetary
and financial stability policy has been subject to continuous change and evolution. When
the environment for central bank policy-making changed, so did the methods for achieving
the two overarching goals of monetary and financial stability, as well as the actual role that
the Nationalbank played in achieving those goals.
In the domain of financial stability policy, the Nationalbank, traditionally had only
limited responsibilities. The authority for issuing banking licences and supervising banks’s
operations as a means of ensuring financial stability was for the longest time within the
jurisdiction of the finance ministry. In this context, the Nationalbank had very few means to
observe or influence the operations of individual banks, apart from insights derived from
individual bank’s recourse to its discount and lending operations and the power to restrict
access to these instruments. Thus, the Nationalbank was confined to intervening only in the
event of acute crises, such as after the stock market crash of 1873 or during the
Creditanstalt crisis of 1931. The national bank’s management time and again tried to
procure a wider range of confidential information about commercial banks and to obtain
control powers. When the Nationalbank attempted to learn more about the foreign liabilities
of Austria’s commercial banks during the interwar years, the banks quickly managed to ward
off the initiative. Not until the banking supervision architecture was fundamentally reformed
in 2008 were all significant powers in on-site and off-site banking analysis transferred to the
Nationalbank.
Especially given Austria’s dramatic history, even important monetary policy-making
powers were often exercised by the state rather than the Nationalbank. This was especially
so during war periods, when the government monetized its debt. The history of Austrian
central banking illustrates then that the pursuit by the government of both “guns” and “butter”
is not conducive to monetary and financial stability.
“A Monetary History of Norway, 1816-2016” by Eitrheim Oyvind, Jan Tore Klovland
and Lars Fredrik Øksendal provides an overview of the history of the Norwegian central
bank, “Norges Bank”, which was founded in 1816. They divide the history in five broad
periods: 1816-1850, 1850-1914, 1914-1940, 1940-1986 and 1986-2016.
Part one starts with a brief overview over the last century of the Dano-Norwegian
union and the collapse of the union’s monetary system after 1807. Norway left the union in
1814 and entered in a loose union with Sweden in 1816. As the authors emphasise, all main
national insitutions in Norway, including Norges Bank, were established in “the formative
years 1814-1816”. Part one goes then further into the reconstruction after the end of the
Napoleonic wars and the difficult process of the restoration of convertibility, finally realised
in 1842.
In part two, covering the period 1850 – 1914, the focus is on the development of the
banking system, especially the rise of private deposit-taking banks. After the successful
reconstruction of the monetary system by the early 1840s, the second half of the nineteenth
century was a period of rapid monetization of the Norwegian economy. During this period
Norges Bank, the monopolist bank of issue, evolved from being a bank among other banks
to become the bank of banks.
Part three analyses on monetary developments in Norway during World War One and
the turbulent interwar years. Norway remained neutral during the war and the economy
expanded strongly during these years. When the boom turned into bust right after the war,
the resumption of the gold standard was postponed until after a severe banking crisis had
been dealt with. The resumption to prewar gold parities followed, which has been strongly
6criticized. The gold standard was abandoned in 1931, a week after the British pound. Prewar
visions were gradually replaced by views in favor of active demand management and
control over the business cycle.
Part four starts with World War II, when Norway was under German occupation.
Thereafter, it focuses on the new economic regime in postwar Norway, with its emphasis
on regulation and central planning, as well as elements of corporative institutions and
financial repression. The “low interest rate regime” in this period warranted the use of a
broad range of instruments, including different forms of credit rationing, in order to manage
aggregate demand and, in particular, to allocate investments to the main areas of priority.
Eventually, the breakdown of the postwar Bretton Woods regime led to a period with new
instabilities: inflation accelerated and was reinforced by the oil price shocks in the 1970s.
Lastly, part five describes the long return to monetary stability after the loss of the
nominal anchor during the 1970s and early 1980s. Like in many other countries, price
stability, defined as low and stable inflation, became the anchor for monetary policy in
Norway. However, the circumstances were difficult as Norway was hit in 1986 by a negative
shock to its terms of trade caused by falling oil prices. Moreover, there was a sharp drop in
housing prices, following several years of booming housing prices after the deregulation of
the housing and credit markets in the early 1980s. In the years 1988-1993, Norway
experienced a severe banking crisis, with systemic proportions in 1991-1992. During the
first half of the 1990s many countries had changed their monetary policy system to that of
(flexible) inflation targeting. In Norway, inflation targeting was, in practice, introduced in
1999 and de jure in March 2001.
Contrary to other books reviewed here, Baltensperger and Kugler, with “Swiss
Monetary History since the Early 19th Century”, do not provide a history of the Swiss
National Bank. Their objective is, in a certain sense, more limited, as they focus on the
monetary history of Switzerland in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. They stress very
much how the fate of the Swiss franc has changed during these two centuries: “At present,
the Swiss franc is soaring and full of vitality. Yet in 1850, when it first came into being,
nobody would have predicted that it would become one of the most successful and strongest
currencies in the world over the course of the years to follow. In fact, during the first half-
century of its existence, the Swiss franc remained a satellite currency of the French franc,
tending not infrequently toward weakness in the market for foreign exchange. At the
beginning of the twentieth century, however, it embarked on a remarkable path which led it
to become the strong international currency that we know today” (p. 1).
The book is divided into three parts. Part one provides a brief overview of the Swiss
political system and of the general economic development of Switzerland since the
formation of the federal state in 1848. The subsequent two parts contain the main body of
the book. Part two presents a chronological overview of Swiss monetary history in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It begins with a review of the processes leading to the
creation of a Swiss national currency in 1850 and, more than fifty years later, the
establishment of a Swiss central bank. In the twentieth century, after the establishment of
a Swiss central bank, the SNB became the main actor in Swiss monetary policy. In a
sequence of chapters, the book covers the SNB’s policies under the international gold
standard; Swiss monetary and currency policies in World War I and the postwar period up
to the outbreak of the global economic crisis at the end of the 1920s; Switzerland’s situation
during the Great Depression; the SNB’s policies during World War II and the subsequent
reform of the international monetary system; the postwar period under the Bretton Woods
fixed exchange rate regime; and finally the radical reorientation of monetary policy under
the system of flexible exchange rates following the collapse of the Bretton Woods regime.
Which lessons can we draw from these histories of several centuries of central
banking?  Based on the history of the Norwegian central bank, Oyvind, Klovland and
7Øksendal (2016) take a rather optimistic view: “If there is an insight to be derived from two
centuries of monetary history of a small country located in the northern periphery of Europe,
it is that central banking has proved to be highly adaptable to changing circumstances. The
ultimate objective of Norges Bank, to maintain trust in money and the monetary system,
remains, but the institutions of that system and the instruments applied to achieve the
objective have changed. As such, central banking is subject to unceasing learning. In this
volume, we have, amongst many other themes, highlighted the role of crises in central bank
evolution.” (p. 598).
Charles Goodhart, in the Riksbank volume (2018), is more cautious, not to say
pessimistic: “the advent of the GFC (Global Financial Crisis) made it abundantly clear that
neither central banks nor economists fully understood the working of the economic system.
We, central bankers and economists, no doubt have learnt many lessons as a result of the
GFC. But, do we yet really understand enough about the workings of the financial system
as a whole? Probably not! The very fact, as outlined earlier, that there are several narratives
about the main causes of the GFC, indicate that there remain many uncertainties about the
way our system works. We cannot be sure that we have learnt the right lessons; uncertainty
remains endemic.” (p. 625-626).
So, central banks will have to remain vigilant. Financial crises will return. Moreover,
the new world of central banking, with a greater responsibility of central banks for financial
stability, will make life more complicated for central banks, having also consequences for
central bank independence. As observed by Alexandre Lamfalussy, in his “Concluding
remarks” for the 20th anniversary of the European Monetary Institute (Maes and Moss 2014),
"having to comply with two distinct mandates pushes the central banks into a much more
complex world. The modalities of their independence in their monetary policy function …
can be reasonably well defined. But in the case of macroprudential independence this is
much more difficult. Once it appears that the initial liquidity problem is shifting toward a
solvency problem, and especially when the latter implies the risk of systemic meltdown, the
central bank has to operate hand in hand with the government ... The macroprudential
mandate requires for the central bank a type of relationship with - and therefore a type of
independence from -  the government that is different in substance from the one governing
monetary policy. The rules of the game on both sides have to be spelled out. The complexity
of the current situation – and the likelihood that it will remain such – means that central
banks will have to continue their navigation in uncharted waters. There is no way of opting
out of this complex world."
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